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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREEDOM OF
THOUGHT-BANISHING SEX OFFENDERS: SEVENTH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS SEX
OFFENDER'S BAN FROM PUBLIC PARKS AFTER THINKING OBSCENE
THOUGHTS ABOUT CHILDREN. Doe v. City ofLafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th
Cir. 2004).
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual assaults and rapes occur with alarming frequency in the United
States.' According to one study, a woman is raped every two minutes in the
United States.2 Children are often victims, also, with the number of sexually
abused children estimated at 100,000 to 500,000 each year.3 The rising
numbers of sex crime convictions and the long-term traumatic effects for
victims have prompted legislators and other government officials to find
innovative methods to combat sex crimes. Pressure from various political
and social forces has prompted lawmakers to enact legislation designating
sex offenders as a separate category of criminals and authorizing procedures
outside the established criminal procedures.5 Efforts to regulate sex offend-
ers and prevent future offenses include civil commitment, registration and
notification requirements, mental and behavioral therapy, and mandatory
drug treatments.6 These efforts must be balanced, however, with the equally
important task of protecting the constitutional rights of offenders, including
the right to think and communicate without government interference, even if
the government finds those thoughts offensive.7
This note discusses the latest development in the regulation of sex of-
fenders by examining the Seventh Circuit decision in Doe v. City of Lafay-
ette, in which the court upheld a sex offender's banishment from public
parks after he admitted he went to a park, observed some children playing,
and had sexual thoughts about them.9 The note begins by examining the
historical development of sex offender legislation, from the sexual psycho-
path laws that dominated much of the twentieth century to the more recent
1. Caroline M. Wong, Comment, Chemical Castration: Oregon 's Innovative Approach
to Sex Offender Rehabilitation, or Unconstitutional Punishment?, 80 OR. L. REv. 267-68
(2001).
2: Id.
3. Id. at 269.
4. Id. at 267-68.
5. Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43, 53
(1998).
6. See infra Part III.
7. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 785 (7th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Doe II1]
(Williams, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 757.
9. Id. at 759-74.
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turn towards regulating offenders after incarceration through various civil
remedies, including sex offender registration and community notification.' 0
Next, the note explains the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Doe" and
concludes with an examination of the significance of the decision.12
II. FACTS
John Doe, a resident of Lafayette, Indiana, is a repeat sex offender with
a long history of convictions.1 3 The majority of Doe's criminal convictions
resulted from sex offenses perpetrated against children.' 4 From 1978 to
1991, he was convicted of numerous sexually related offenses, including
child molestation, voyeurism, exhibitionism, and peeping.' 5 His most recent
conviction occurred in 1991, when he was convicted of attempted child
molesting and attempted child solicitation.' 6 Doe was sentenced to house
arrest from January 1992 to January 1996 and was then on probation until
early January 2000.17
In late January 2000, Doe parked his car at a city park and observed
several children in their early to mid teens playing on a baseball field.' 8 Doe
watched the children for fifteen to thirty minutes and had sexual thoughts
about them, but he recognized the thoughts as inappropriate and left the
park.' 9 Doe was upset and immediately informed his therapist of the inci-
dent and later discussed it with his support group-Sexual Addicts Anony-
mous. 20 In response to the incident, Doe voluntarily began hormonal treat-
ments (Depo-Provera) to help suppress his sexual urges.2'
On January 20, 2000, Doe's former probation officer received a phone
call from a confidential source, informing him that Doe had been in the park
10. See infra Part 11.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 758. John Doe was a name given to the offender by the courts
to protect his anonymity. Joe Gerrety, Parks Ban Sparks Lawsuit, Debate Over Sex Offend-
ers, J. & COURIER (Lafayette, Ind.), April 4, 2004, at 18A. Although his real name had ap-
peared in print before, the local newspaper also elected to use the pseudonym in reporting on
the case. Id.
14. DoeIII, 377 F.3d at 758-59.
15. Id. at 758-59; see also Joe Gerrety, 'Paying For Being Honest', J. & COURIER (La-
fayette, Ind.), Apr. 4, 2004, at 8A (providing a detailed timeline of John Doe's arrests and
charges for sex offenses in Lafayette).
16. Gerrety, supra note 15, at 8A.
17. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 759.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 774 (Willams, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 775 (Williams, J., dissenting). According to his therapist, Doe's ability to
identify and control his urges was a positive step in his rehabilitation. Id.
21. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
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watching young children.22 The probation officer forwarded the information
to the Lafayette police department, which in turn contacted the superinten-
dent of the Lafayette Parks and Recreation Department and the superinten-
dent of the Lafayette School Corporation.23 The police chief advised the
superintendents to issue a ban ordering Doe not to enter the city's parks or
schools.24 In early February 2000, Doe received letters from both superin-
tendents informing him he was prohibited from entering the city's parks or
coming onto school grounds.25 The city offered no pre-issuance review or
hearing before imposing the bans, and Doe was not given an opportunity to
appeal the decisions.26 The bans were imposed under threat of arrest for
27trespass. Neither of the bans were limited in duration or geographical area
within the city park system.28
Doe filed suit against the city, alleging the ban from public parks vio-
lated his First Amendment rights and Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights.29 Specifically, Doe argued that he was being punished for his
thoughts in violation of the First Amendment, 30 and the ban violated his
substantive due process rights by denying him his "fundamental right to
enjoy and wander through a public park., 31 Both parties filed for summary
judgment, 32 and the district court granted summary judgment for the city.33
With regard to the First Amendment claim, the district court concluded that
Doe had not identified any form of expressive conduct that was impinged
by the ban, and "any incidental impact upon Doe's 'thoughts' does not bar
the city of Lafayette's legitimate interests in protecting its youth., 34 In re-
sponse to Doe's due process argument, the court ruled that he had failed to
identify a fundamental liberty interest, 35 and under a rational basis standard
22. Id. at 759.
23. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 760.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 775 (Williams, J., dissenting).
27. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 760. The city has an extensive park system which includes several parks, a
zoo, a golf course, pools, a baseball stadium, and a sports complex. Id. at 775 (Williams, J.,
dissenting). Bans from city parks are usually issued for a week or in some cases for a sum-
mer, given to those who have vandalized or interfered with park patrons. Id. (Williams, J.,
dissenting).
29. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 160 F. Supp. 2d 996, 996 (N.D. Ind. 2001) [hereinafter
Doe 1].
30. Id. at 1000.
31. Id. at 100L1.
32. Id. at 997.
33. Id. at 1004.
34. Id. at 1001.
35. Doe !, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (rejecting the notion that there is a fundamental right
to intrastate travel or freedom of movement).
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of review, the ban was narrowly tailored and served a strong and legitimate
city interest in securing the safety of its minor citizens. 36
Doe appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, and a majority of a three-member panel of judges reversed the dis-
trict court's ruling. 37 The court framed the issue: "[M]ay a city constitution-
ally ban one of its citizens from public property based on its discovery of
that individual's immoral thoughts? '38 The court answered the question in
the negative and ruled that the ban punished Doe for his thoughts in viola-
tion of the First Amendment. 39 The city petitioned for a rehearing before the
40full Seventh Circuit, and the court granted the petition.
III. BACKGROUND
Courts and lawmakers have long struggled to find appropriate and ef-
fective ways to control sexually deviant behavior.4' In the colonial United
States, most sexual behavior was considered morally reprehensible and
therefore illegal.42 Public punishment, such as public beatings, branding, or
use of a pillory, was used to prevent recurrence, deter others, and humiliate
the offender.43 Public humiliation eventually fell out of use as society pro-
gressed and many of the previous methods of punishment were found to be
cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion.44 Instead, sex offenders were convicted and sentenced to prison much
like any other criminal offender.45 At that time, "it was not considered nec-
essary to differentiate sex offenders from other offenders in terms of pun-
ishment. 46 During the early twentieth century, an apparent increase in the
frequency of sex offenses and the widespread publicity the crimes received
36. Id. at 1004.
37. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 334 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Doe ll].
38. Id. at 608. The city admitted that Doe's revelation of his thoughts, and not any out-
ward indication of his thinking, was the basis for its action. Id.
39. Id. at 613 ("[T]he fact that this court or the City of Lafayette finds Doe's thoughts
offensive does not limit the amount of First Amendment protection they are afforded.").
40. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 757.
41. See generally Lieb, supra note 5, at 53-84.
42. Michelle Pia Jerusalem, Note, A Framework for Post-Sentence Sex Offender Legis-
lation: Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the Public's "Right" To Know, 48
VAND. L. REv. 219, 224 (1995).
43. Id. at 224-25. The most famous illustration of humiliation as punishment is Nathan-
iel Hawthorne's A Scarlet Letter, in which a woman was forced to wear a scarlet "A" on her
chest as punishment for committing adultery. Id. at 224.
44. Id. at 225.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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led to new formulations of law recognizing that sex offenders "require[ed]
special consideration for [their] own sake and the sake of society. '' 7
Over the past hundred years, sex offender laws have developed
throughout three distinct periods of legislation and public attention on sex
offenders.4a The first period, spanning from the early twentieth century
through the 1970s, concentrated on the civil commitment and treatment of
sex offenders in lieu of punishment.49 Castration was also an acceptable
form of treatment for criminals, including sex offenders, at least during the
first half of the twentieth century.50 The second period began in the 1970s
and was led by the feminist movement, which advocated rape law reforms
and better treatment for rape victims.5' The third period began in late 1980s
and early 1990s and focused on controlling, monitoring, and treating sex
offenders after incarceration. 2
A. Treatment, Not Punishment, of Sex Offenders
A series of sexually motivated murders in the 1930s spawned the first
wave of sex offender legislation.53 In Michigan, the discovery of a young
girl's mutilated body in a trunk, found in the apartment of a sex offender
who had previously been committed to a mental institution, triggered the
passage of the first so-called "sexual psychopath" law in 1937.54 A typical
statute defined a sexual psychopath as someone who was "predisposed to
the commission of sex crimes and who is dangerous to society. 55 These
statutes authorized the civil commitment of a person classified as "sexually
dangerous" for an indefinite period of time.56 The statutes allowed the gov-
ernment to achieve the dual goals of removing the sex offender from the
community and treating the underlying mental condition of the offender.5 7
These goals reflected the "buoyant therapeutic optimism" of the time; the
idea that these offenders could be removed from society and "cured" had
47. Id. at 225-26.
48. Lieb, supra note 5, at 53.
49. See Jerusalem, supra note 42, at 226; Lieb, supra note 5, at 53-56.
50. See Wong, supra note 1, at 271.
51. See Lieb, supra note 5, at 53-54; Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement:
The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 119, 120-29
(1999).
52. Lieb, supra note 5, at 65-83.
53. Id. at 53.
54. Id. at 55. See MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 780.501 to .509 (Callaghan 1937) (repealed
1967).
55. Carol Veneziano & Louis Veneziano, An Analysis of Legal Trends in the Disposi-
tion of Sex Crimes: Implications for Theory, Research, and Policy, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
205, 206 (1987).
56. Id. at 206-07.
57. Lieb, supra note 5, at 55.
2005]
UALR LAW REVIEW
tremendous appeal to both the public and the mental health community.58
By 1970, twenty-nine states had enacted some form of sexual psychopath
law.59
Sexual psychopath statutes "were principally viewed as civil in nature,
therefore necessitating fewer procedural rights than criminal law., 60 These
laws were challenged, however, on a number of constitutional grounds, in-
cluding procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, and the
Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.6' For most
courts, "in determining the constitutionality of the sex psychopath statutes,
the crux of [their] consideration rest[ed] upon the judicial determination of
whether the proceedings under the act [were] criminal or civil. 62
The United States Supreme Court made its first ruling regarding a sex-
ual psychopath statute in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court.63 The
statute in question authorized indefinite civil commitment for those with
"psychopathic personality disorder."64 The Court found no violation of due
process 65 and concluded that Minnesota was acting within its rights by iden-
tifying such psychopaths as "a dangerous element in the community.,' 66
Almost thirty years later, the Supreme Court changed its views when it
decided the landmark case of Specht v. Patterson.67 The Court was faced
with the issue of whether a defendant could be convicted for indecent liber-
ties under the Colorado criminal law but then sentenced under the Colorado
Sex Offenders Act, which authorized the commitment of the defendant for
an indefinite term of one day to life without notice or a full hearing.68 The
Court concluded that the "commitment proceedings whether denominated
civil or criminal are subject both to the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
58. Id. at 56.
59. Veneziano & Veneziano, supra note 55, at 206.
60. Lieb, supra note 5, at 62-63.
61. Veneziano & Veneziano, supra note 55, at 208.
62. Id. at 209 (quoting In re Keddy, 233 P.2d 159 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951); In re Be-
viii, 442 P.2d 679 (Cal. 1968); People v. Chapman, 4 N.W.2d 18 (Mich. 1942)).
63. 309 U.S. 270 (1940). Pearson sought a writ of prohibition commanding the Minne-
sota courts to desist proceedings to classify him as a "psychopathic personality," and con-
tended that the statute violated his due process and equal protection rights. Id. at 271-72.
64. Id. at 276. A "psychopathic personality" is defined as a person with "such condi-
tions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards
of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts... as to render such
person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to
other persons." Id. at 272.
65. Id. at 277.
66. Id. at 275 ("[T]he legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it may con-
fine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest.").
67. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
68. Id. at 607.
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teenth Amendment... and to the Due Process Clause. '69 A person subject
to the Colorado Sex Offenders Act deserved procedural protections, includ-
ing the right to counsel, the opportunity to be heard, the right to confront
witnesses against him, and the right to cross-examine and offer evidence of
his own.70
Specht did not decide what standard of proof would be necessary in
sexual psychopath proceedings. 71 The standard of proof for civil proceed-
ings is usually "preponderance of the evidence," while "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" is the standard of proof for criminal proceedings.72 In In
re Winship, the Court applied the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard to a civil proceeding for the first time, 73 citing the substantial depriva-
tion of liberty as a major factor in doing SO. 7 4 The reasonable doubt standard
has since been adopted by many jurisdictions for deciding civil commitment
cases.
75
B. Castration to Control Criminal Behavior
Castration was also used as punishment in the first part of the twentieth
century.76 For example, in State v. Feilen,77 the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton upheld a defendant's sentence of life imprisonment coupled with a va-
sectomy after being convicted of raping a little girl.78 The court held that a
vasectomy is not a cruel punishment and noted that the Journal of the
American Medical Association recommended "the sterilization of criminals
and the prevention of their further propagation., 79 In Buck v. Bell,80 the
69. Id. at 608.
70. Id. at 610.
71. Veneziano & Veneziano, supra note 55, at 210.
72. Id.
73. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
74. Id. at 366. The issue in Winship was whether the reasonable doubt standard should
be applied to the civil adjudication of a juvenile when charged with delinquency for commit-
ting what constitutes larceny under the criminal law. Id. at 359. The Court rejected the
"'civil' label-of-convenience" attached to the proceedings and held that "a proceeding where
the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his
liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution." Id. at 365-66 (quoting
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967)).
75. Veneziano & Veneziano, supra note 55, at 210. "A growing number of jurisdictions
have considered commitment proceedings so closely analogous to criminal trials that only
proof beyond a reasonable doubt can satisfy due process." Id.
76. Wong, supra note 1, at 271. "The eugenics movement of the early twentieth century
endorsed both castration and sterilization to punish and to 'achieve the elimination of social
ills through biological reformation."' Id.
77. 126 P. 75 (Wash. 1912).
78. Id. at 76, 78.
79. Id. at 77.
80. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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United States Supreme Court held that a state law which authorized the ster-
ilization of "mental defectives" was not unconstitutional, 8' and the case has
never officially been overturned.82 But by the end of World War II, most
likely in response to the atrocities perpetrated in Nazi Germany, the physi-
cal castration of criminals had all but ceased.83 In recent years, however,
some courts and lawmakers have turned to the chemical castration of sex
offenders to control the offenders' sexual urges and reduce the risk of reof-
fending.84
C. Rape Law Reform
The second era of legislative activity regarding sex crimes was led by
the feminist movement of the 1970s.85 Women's groups, most notably the
National Organization of Women, set out to reform traditional rape law.
86
They argued that the law failed to reflect "the changing status of women in
American society" and did more to preserve male rights than to protect
women. 87 They also drew attention away from "stranger rape" and toward a
broader variety of sex crimes, including rape and sexual abuse in families
and other intimate relationships. 88 Rape reform, it was believed, would im-
prove the treatment of rape victims, encourage victims of rape to come for-
ward and report the crime, and remove barriers to the successful prosecution
of rapists. 89 In 1974, Michigan was the first state to modify its rape statute,
and other states soon followed.90 Almost every state had enacted some type
of rape reform legislation by the mid-1980s.91
81. Id. at 208. A "mental defective" was a person afflicted with a heredity condition
such as insanity or imbecility. Id. at 205-06. Sterilizing these individuals allowed society to
"prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." Id. at 207.
82. But see Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 750 (6th Cir. 1996) (recognizing the abroga-
tion of Buck); Matter of Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. 1990) (calling into doubt the
validity of Buck's holding).
83. Wong, supra note 1, at 271.
84. See infra Part III.D.3.
85. Lieb, supra note 5, at 53-54.
86. Spohn, supra note 51, at 121.
87. Id. For example, the law at that time (1) allowed a victim's prior sexual history to be
used to impeach her credibility; (2) required a victim to physically resist the attack through-
out the rape, even though resistance often increased the likelihood of serious injury; and (3)
required corroboration of a victim's testimony in order to prosecute the offender. See id. at
121-26. Additionally, traditional definitions of rape included only penile-vaginal penetration
and did not include attacks on male victims, sexual assaults by a spouse, or assaults with an
object. Id. at 122.
88. Lieb, supra note 5, at 54.
89. Spohn, supra note 51, at 121.
90. Ronet Bachman, Ph.D. & Raymond Paternoster, Ph.D., A Contemporary Look at the
Effects of Rape Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 554, 559 (1993). Changes to rape laws included: (1) replacing the single crime
[Vol. 28
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D. Controlling Sex Offenders Through Post-Sentence Regulations
By the late 1970s, the idea that sex offenders could be "cured" was fal-
ling into disfavor.92 In 1977 the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry
publicly challenged the validity of sexual psychopath laws, and in the early
1980s, a series of sexually motivated child murders were committed by
"graduates" of a California sex offender treatment program who had sup-
posedly been cured of their sexual urges.93 By 1976 twenty-five states had
either repealed or significantly modified their sexual psychopath laws.
94
Community concern and the need for some type of social control con-
tinued despite the repeal of sexual psychopath laws.95 In the wake of a series
of highly-publicized sex crimes in the early 1990s, lawmakers formulated
laws that focused on controlling the sex offender after incarceration.96 These
laws, known as "sexual predator" laws, focused on three main areas: civil
commitment of offenders after incarceration, registration and notification
laws, and relapse prevention.97
1. Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders
Washington was the first state to expressly authorize the postsentence
civil commitment of sex offenders.98 The statute, the Community Protection
Act of 1990, was prompted by the kidnapping, rape, and mutilation of a
seven-year-old boy by a sex offender released from prison two years ear-
lier.99 Prison officials knew this offender had plans to abuse other children
after his release, but they had no option but to release him after he had
of rape, which was historically defined as "carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly and
against her will," with a series of gender-neutral graded offenses; (2) redefining penetration
to include anal intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, or any other intrusion of any part of a per-
son's body with an object; and (3) eliminating the spousal exception. Spohn, supra note 51,
at 122-23.
91. Spohn, supra note 51, at 121. The reform of state rape statutes also had an effect on
federal law, as evidenced by the 1978 enactment of Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which generally excludes from evidence all reputation and opinion testimony con-
cerning a victim's prior sexual conduct. Bachman, supra note 90, at 559.
92. Lieb, supra note 5, at 65.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 63.
95. Id. at 65.
96. Id. at 65-66.
97. See id. at 65-83, 91-94.
98. W. Lawrence Fitch & Debra A. Hammen, The New Generation of Sex Offender
Commitment Laws: Which States Have Them and How Do They Work?, in PROTECTING
SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS 27, 28 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. La-
Fond, eds., 2003).
99. Id. The Community Protection Act also established the first sex offender registration
system. Id. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
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served his sentence. 00 The community was outraged,1' and legislators re-
sponded by authorizing the indefinite treatment and confinement of sex
offenders who suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
makes the person likely to engage in future predatory acts of sexual vio-
lence. 10 2 Prosecutors can initiate civil proceedings to have an inmate com-
mitted before he is released from prison. °3 After the state has proved its
case beyond a reasonable doubt, a person can be confined for treatment until
he is deemed safe for release. 1°4 Washington's civil commitment law be-
came the national model, 10 5 and by the end of the 1990s, fifteen states had
similar laws.'
06
Opponents of civil commitment argue that these laws are an ex post
facto punishment, enacted solely "to extend the period of confinement for
prisoners whose terms have already expired under the laws in effect at the
time of their offenses."' 1 7 The United States Supreme Court addressed this
argument as well as other constitutional arguments against civil commit-
ment in Kansas v. Hendricks.10 8 The defendant, Hendricks, was a pedophile
serving a ten-year sentence for taking "indecent liberties" with two thirteen-
year-old boys. 0 9 Before his scheduled release to a halfway house, the State
filed a civil commitment petition pursuant to the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act. 10 Hendricks objected on various constitutional grounds and
requested a jury trial to determine whether he qualified as a sexually violent
predator."' After hearing Hendricks's "chilling history of repeated child
100. Lieb, supra note 5, at 66.
101. Jerusalem, supra note 42, at 228. "A group of citizens called the 'Tennis Shoe Bri-
gade' formed and sent over 15,000 tennis shoes-symbols for victimized children-to Wash-
ington's governor in protest of the state's 'lenient' sex offender laws." Id.
102. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (WEST 2005). The person must also have at
least one prior conviction for a sexually violent offense. Id at § 71.09.030.
103. Id. at § 71.09.025. Interestingly, the statute provides that the person at issue in the
commitment proceeding shall have all the constitutional rights that are available to defen-
dants at criminal trials. Id. at § 71.09.060(2).
104. Id. at § 71.09.060(1). Each person committed under the statute is examined annually
by the department of social and health services to determine if he is fit for release.
Id. at § 71.09.070.
105. Fitch & Hamnen, supra note 98, at 28-29.
106. Id. at 27.
107. Howard V. Zonana et al., In the Wake of Hendricks: The Treatment and Restraint of
Sexually Dangerous Offenders Viewed From the Perspective of American Psychiatry, in
PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS 131, 143 (Bruce J. Winick &
John Q. LaFord, eds., 2003).
108. 521 U.S. 346, 346 (1997).
109. Id. at 353. "Indecent liberties" is defined as lewd fondling or touching, or the solici-
tation of lewd fondling or touching, of a child who is fourteen or more years of age but less
than sixteen years of age. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3503 (2003).
110. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353-54. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 et. seq. (1994).
111. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 354.
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sexual molestation and abuse," the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator. 1 2 Hendricks appealed,
claiming violations of the due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto
clauses of the Constitution. 13 In a five-to-four decision, the Court upheld
the statute's constitutionality. 14 The Court held that the statute did not vio-
late procedural due process, citing the procedural safeguards that governed
the civil commitment proceeding," 5 and did not violate substantive due
process according to the previously upheld concept that states can, in certain
circumstances, provide for the "forcible civil detainment of people who are
unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public
health and safety."
'
"
16
Hendricks argued the civil commitment procedure violated the double
jeopardy and ex post facto clauses because the procedure was actually a
"newly enacted 'punishment"' based upon past conduct"' 7 The Court re-
jected this contention, stating that the Act did not implicate the two primary
objectives of criminal punishment-retribution and deterrence. 1 8 The Court
noted the civil confinement of "mentally unstable individuals who present a
danger to the public" is a classic example of nonpunitive detention."19 Jus-
tice Kennedy, however, cautioned against the "dangers inherent when a
civil confinement law is used in conjunction with the criminal process .
,,120
Recently, the Court revisited the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act
in Kansas v. Crane.'21 In that case, the Court acknowledged that sexual
predator statutes could be misused to achieve criminal law goals of retribu-
tion and deterrence if not properly applied. 122 The Court stressed the "con-
stitutional importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject
to civil commitment 'from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.""' 123 The
Court clarified its opinion in Hendricks by requiring the government to
112. Id. at 354-55.
113. Id. at 356.
114. Id. at 371. Several states quickly took action to enact their own civil commitment
legislation after the Court announced its ruling, including the New York Legislature, whose
Senate passed similar legislation only two days after the Court's decision. Matthew Purdy,
Wave of New Laws Seeks to Confine Sexual Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1997, at 11.
115. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352-53, 371.
116. Id. at 357, 371.
117. Id. at 361.
118. Id. at 361-62.
119. Id. at 362-63 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987)).
120. Id. at 371-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. 534 U.S. 407,407 (2002).
122. Id. at 412.
123. Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360).
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prove the offender suffers from "a serious ... disorder" that consists of a
"special and serious lack of ability to control [his] behavior" before he or
she can be committed as a sexual predator.
24
2. Registration and Notification Laws
Another key development in the nineties was the proliferation of sex
offender registration and community notification laws. 25 Registration ordi-
nances had been used since the 1930s, and California enacted a registration
law for sex offenders in 1944.126 But the use of registration laws as seen
today did not begin to develop until the late 1980s, and now every state re-
quires convicted sex offenders to register with law enforcement agencies
upon release. 127 In 1994 Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program
Act, 128 which requires states "to create registries of offenders convicted of
sexually violent offenses or crimes against children and to establish more
rigorous registration requirements for highly dangerous sex offenders ...
,,129 The Act requires sex offenders to verify their addresses annually for
ten years and requires sexually violent predators to verify their addresses for
life for certain high risk offenders. 130 States that did not comply with the
requirements by September 1997 faced a reduction in federal grant funds for
law enforcement. 131
State registration statutes require released sex offenders to register with
the local police department where they live.' 32 Usually, offenders must pro-
124. 1d. at 412-13.
125. See Jerusalem, supra note 42, at 226-27; Lieb, supra note 5, at 71.
126. Lieb, supra note 5, at 71.
127. Id. Indiana has a Sex and Violent Offender Directory maintained by the Indiana
Criminal Justice Institute (see IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12 (West 2005)), and the Indiana Sher-
iffs' Sex Offender Registry, an online directory organized by county of residence that pro-
vides the identity, location, and appearance of all registered sex offenders (IND. CODE ANN. §
36-2-13-5.5 (West 2005)). John Doe was not a registered sex offender under either statute,
however, because the registration law originally required only those offenders convicted after
June 30, 1994 to register with law enforcement authorities. Indiana Sex and Violent Offend-
ers Registry at http://www.indianasheriffs.org/default.asp (last visited Aug. 26, 2005). The
statute was amended to apply retroactively effective July 1, 2001. Id.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994).
129. Lieb, supra note 5, at 72. In 1989, Jacob Wetterling was abducted near his home in
St. Joseph, Minnesota by an armed, masked man. Id. at 114, n. 1. He is still missing. National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children at http://www.
ncmec.org/missingkids/servlet/PubCaseSearchServlet (last visited Aug. 26, 2005).
130. 42 U.S.C.§ 14071(b)(6).
131. Id. at § 14071(g).
132. Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Sex Offender Registra-
tion and Community Notification Laws, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS, 213, 214 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. LaFond, eds., 2003).
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vide information including their name, social security number, age, race,
date of birth, height, weight, hair and eye color, permanent and any tempo-
rary address, place of employment, and the date and place of each convic-
tion. 133 Offenders must also provide fingerprints, and some states require a
photograph of the offender, a blood sample, or a hair sample. 134 This infor-
mation is available to the public, either on the internet or at the police de-
partment or other state offices.135 Registration statutes have been challenged
on constitutional grounds, including due process, double jeopardy, and right
to privacy, but most courts have found that "registration is a reasonable ex-
ercise of regulatory power and that any potential rights infringements are
outweighed by the requirement's contributions to public safety.' 3 6
Community notification laws first appeared in Washington in 1990, al-
lowing the "release of information to public about released sex offenders
judged to pose high risks of reoffending."' 137 By 1994 community notifica-
tion became known as "Megan's Law" after New Jersey passed its notifica-
tion statute in honor of Megan Kanka, who was raped and killed by a child
molester living in her neighborhood. 138 A federal Megan's Law passed in
1996, which provided that state or local law enforcement agencies "shall
release relevant information that is necessary to protect the public concern-
ing a specific person required to register."' 139 States that did not comply
again faced a reduction in federal funding.
140
A majority of jurisdictions use a tiered system to rank offenders ac-
cording to their level of risk of reoffending, which determines what level of
notification is required. 141
All offenders are placed in Tier 1 at a minimum, and details concerning
their identity and prior offenses are given to all law enforcement agen-
cies in the state that are likely to encounter them. For offenders placed in
Tier 2, those who present a moderate risk of reoffending, notice is given
to organizations in the community, including schools and religious and
youth organizations with which the offender is likely to have contact.
For offenders placed in Tier 3, those who present a high risk of reoffend-
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. In Louisiana, offenders are required to place an ad in the local newspaper with
information about their offense and criminal background. Id. Louisiana may also require an
offender to put a bumper sticker on his car or display labels on his clothing. Id.
136. Lieb, supra note 5, at 71.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 72. Megan's killer, Jesse Timmendequas, was a released sex offender sharing
a house with two other released sex offenders in the New Jersey suburb where Megan lived.
Winick, supra note 132, at 213.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (1996).
140. Id. at § 14071(g).
141. Winick, supra note 132, at 214-15.
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ing, notice is also given to members of the community likely to encoun-
ter the offender. 1
42
Community notification laws have strong public support; for example,
a 1997 newspaper poll of adults in Georgia found that seventy-nine percent
agreed that the public had a right to know about a sex offender's past, and
that right was more important than the privacy rights of the offender.143 In
addition, notification laws have positive psychological effects on commu-
nity members and law enforcement officials. 144 Notification gives parents
and other community members a sense of control and empowerment and
provides law enforcement the opportunity to assist the community in pre-
venting future crimes.
45
Opponents of community notification laws argue that they are uncon-
stitutional in several respects. 146 One argument is that the laws violate the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment by attaching a
stigma to the offender. 147 Opponents contend that this public humiliation
component of the law "does not comport with current standards of decency"
and therefore violates "the spirit of the Eighth Amendment.', 48 Another
argument against notification laws is that they violate an offender's right to
privacy. 149 Opponents also argue that registration and notification laws vio-
late the ex post facto clause because the laws generally apply retroactively
and apply to offenders convicted before the laws were enacted. 150 The lower
courts have consistently found that "Megan's Laws are constitutional and
that their principal purpose is regulatory in nature and not punitive."' 5'
142. Id. at216.
143. Jane 0. Hansen, Sexual Predators: Why Megan's Law Is Not Enough, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, June 10, 1997, at I1D.
144. See Winick, supra note 132, at 216-17.
145. Id. Critics argue that notification also provokes vigilantism, such as the community
action taken in Lynnwood, Washington when residents were told a child rapist was about to
be released and move into their neighborhood. James Popkin et al., Natural Born Predators,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 19, 1994, at 64. The offender's house was burned to the
ground on the day he was scheduled to move in. Id. A similar incident occurred in Detroit,
where neighbors posted signs saying "Child Molester Lives Here" and flooded the newly
rented apartment of an offender by stuffing tissues in his bathtub drain. Id.
146. See Jerusalem, supra note 42, at 241-45; Lieb, supra note 5, at 76-79.
147. Jerusalem, supra note 42, at 242.
148. Id. at 242-43.
149. Id. at 244.
150. Lieb, supra note 5, at 76.
151. Id.; see, e.g., Kellar v. Fayetteville Police Dept., 339 Ark. 274, 5 S.W.3d 402 (1999)
(holding that the notification provision of the Arkansas Sex and Child Offender Registration
Act did not violate state and federal ex post facto clauses); People v. Logan, 705 N.E.2d 152
(Ill. App. 3d 1998) (holding that sex offender statute did not violate a convicted sex of-
fender's constitutional right to privacy because the sex offender's interest concerning his
home address was not within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy); State v. Scott,
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The Supreme Court recently addressed these constitutional challenges
to registration and notification laws for the first time in two cases, Con-
necticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe'52 and Smith v. Doe.'53 In Con-
necticut Department of Public Safety, a convicted sex offender subject to
Connecticut's Megan's Law filed suit claiming that the law violated his due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 4 The defendant objected
to being labeled as a "dangerous sexual offender," and he argued that the
law "deprive[d] him of a liberty interest-his reputation combined with the
alteration of his status under state law-without notice or a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard."' 55 The United States District Court agreed and en-
joined the public disclosure of the sex offender registry. 56 The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 57 but the Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment.1 58 The Court noted that Connecticut's registry, maintained on a state
website, included a disclaimer that stated no offender listed on the registry
had been declared currently dangerous. 59 The disclaimer further stated that
the names were included on the registry "solely by virtue of their conviction
record and state law."' 160 Therefore, whether the defendant is deemed cur-
rently dangerous makes no difference under the law, because "the law's
requirements turn on an offender's conviction alone-a fact that a convicted
offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to con-
test." 1
61
In Smith two convicted sex offenders sought to have Alaska's Sex Of-
fender Registration Act declared void as applied to them under the ex post
facto clause and the due process clause. 162 The offenders were released from
prison in 1990.163 The Alaska law, passed in 1994, contained both a regis-
tration requirement and a notification system and was applied retroac-
tively. 164 The United States District Court found against the offenders, but
961 P.2d 667 (Kan. 1998) (holding the punitive effects of the sex offender statute were not so
disproportionate to the offender's sexually motivated crime as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Federal Constitution).
152. 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
153. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
154. Connecticut Dep 't. of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 5-6.
155. Id. at 6 (quoting Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 45-46 (2d
Cir. 2001)).
156. Connecticut Dep't. of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 6.
157. Doe v. Dep't. of Public Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 62 (2d Cir. 2001).
158. Connecticut Dep 't. of Public Safety, 538 U.S at 8.
159. Id. at 5.
160. Id. (quoting Lee, 271 F.3d at 44).
161. Id. at 7.
162. Smith, 538 U.S, at 91.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 90.
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the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 165 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that while the legislature had intended the Act to be a civil, non-
punitive regulatory scheme, the effects of the Act were nonetheless punitive
and therefore violated the ex post facto clause. 166
The Supreme Court began its analysis by examining the nature of the
Act to determine if it was a civil or criminal enactment. 167 The framework
for this inquiry was clearly laid out by the Court six years earlier in Hudson
v. United States.'68 First, a court must ask whether the legislature has indi-
cated the nature of the law in question 69 Then, even if the legislature has
indicated its intent to establish a civil penalty, the court must examine the
purpose and effect of the law. 170 If a law is clearly punitive, it will be con-
sidered a criminal penalty despite the intent to create a civil penalty. 7'
Courts are guided by seven factors when determining whether a law is puni-
tive:
(1) [W]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
(2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3)
whether it comes into play only on a finding of a scienter; (4) whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in re-
lation to the alternative purpose assigned. 172
Only "the clearest proof' of a law's punitive purpose or effect will be
enough to override the stated legislative intent.
73
Using this framework, the Court first observed that "considerable def-
erence" would be given to the intent of the Act as the legislature has
stated. 74 In the text of the Act, the Alaska legislature identified "protecting
the public from sex offenders" as their primary objective, and further stated
that releasing certain information regarding sex offenders to the general
public would assist in protecting public safety. 17 5 The Court, noting their
similar ruling in Kansas v. Hendricks, stated that imposing restrictive meas-
165. Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 995 (9th Cir. 2001).
166. Id. at 993-94.
167. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92-93.
168. 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
169. Id. at 99.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 99-100 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168--69
(1963).
173. Id. at 100.
174. Smith, 538 U.S. at 93.
175. Id.
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ures on sex offenders who were judged to be dangerous to society had his-
torically been regarded as a legitimate and nonpunitive government objec-
tive. 176 The Court then referred to the Mendoza-Martinez factors and found
that none of them applied as to render the Act punitive in nature. 177 In short,
"[o]ur system does not treat dissemination of truthful information in fur-
therance of a legitimate governmental objective as punishment."' 7 8
3. Relapse Prevention
In addition to registration and notification laws, a number of jurisdic-
tions have implemented additional methods designed to monitor and treat
sex offenders on probation or parole. 179 These post-institutional treatment
methods are designed to "increase the likelihood of rehabilitation when the
individual is subjected to the stresses and temptations of resuming life in
society."' 80 One method utilized by a number of states is the use of hormo-
nal treatments.1 81 "First tested in the 1960's, the use of hormone suppres-
sors, i.e., 'chemical castration,' has been very successful in the treatment of
sex offenders."'' 8 2 The most common treatment used today is a synthetic
hormone called medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), manufactured under
the trade name Depo-Provera. 8 3 MPA helps control sexually deviant behav-
ior by acting as a "sexual appetite suppressant."'' 8 4 It lowers the amount of
testosterone in a person's body, thereby diminishing the libido and the func-
tioning of genitalia.18 5 Decreasing sexual urges allows an offender to take a
"vacation" from his sex drive and benefit from "psycho-sexual realignment"
along with counseling.1
8 6
176. Id.
177. See id. at 97-105.
178. Id. at 98.
179. Kim English et al., Community Containment of Sex Offender Risk: A Promising
Approach, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS, 265 (Bruce J.
Winick & John Q. LaFond, eds. 2003).
180. Id. at 277.
181. See Audrey Moog, Note, California Penal Code Section 645: Legislators Practice
Medicine on Child Molesters, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 711, 712-13 (1999); Linda
Beckman, Student Work, Chemical Castration: Constitutional Issues of Due Process, Equal
Protection, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 100 W. VA. L. REv. 853, 854-55 (1998).
Several states, including California, Georgia, Montana, Florida, and Louisiana, have enacted
or are considering legislation that either allows or mandates the use of chemical castration for
sex offenders. Id.
182. Kimberly A. Peters, Comment, Chemical Castration: An Alternative to Incarcera-
tion, 31 DUQ. L. REv. 307, 310 (1993).
183. Id.
184. Moog, supra note 181, at 720.
185. Karen Rebish, Nipping the Problem in the Bud: The Constitutionality of California's
Castration Law, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 507, 516 (1998).
186. Id- at 516-17
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Any statute requiring the use of MPA will be subject to several consti-
tutional concerns, including the First Amendment right to mental autonomy,
the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and the
Fourteenth Amendment's right to bodily integrity, which encompasses the
right to procreate and the right to refuse medical treatment. 187 A small num-
ber of cases have challenged MPA treatment on constitutional grounds, spe-
cifically alleging an Eight Amendment violation, but the courts bypassed
deciding the constitutional issue and instead resolved the appeals on proce-
dural grounds. 188
Other treatments aimed at relapse prevention begin while the offender
is still incarcerated.1 89 These treatment programs teach offenders to "recog-
nize and avert the chain of affective, cognitive, and behavioral events" that
precede offending.' 90 The methods employed include skill training to im-
prove interpersonal relations, aversion therapy to reduce sexual arousal, and
therapy to correct distorted attitudes or beliefs concerning sexual relation-
ships.19 Hormonal therapy is sometimes implemented as well.
92
Ideally, therapy and other behavior modification treatments will con-
tinue once the offender is released.193 One promising new approach is the
"community containment approach."' 94 In this approach, an offender is
monitored by a specially trained case management team.195 Team members
include a probation or parole officer, a therapy provider, and polygraph ex-
aminer, who "act together to decrease or eliminate an individual's privacy,
opportunity, and access to potential or past victims. 1 96 To ensure the team
is receiving accurate and truthful information from the offender, periodic
polygraphs are added to the treatment plan.' 97 This system is designed to
increase the efficiency of the team and provide a method by which they can
187. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Sexual
Offender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 25-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
188. See Houston v. State, 852 So. 2d 425 (2003) (reversing the portion of the defen-
dant's sentence that required MPA treatment because the trial court did not appoint a medical
examiner to determine whether defendant was a candidate for treatment, nor did it specify
the duration of treatment, as required by statute); People v. Foster, 101 Cal. App. 4th 247
(2002) (holding that a defendant who agreed to a plea bargain that included the possibility of
hormone suppression treatment, and who also agreed to waive the right to appeal any sen-
tence he received within the terms of the agreement, was precluded from appellate review of
his sentence imposing hormone suppression treatment upon parole).
189. See Lieb, supra note 5, at 91-92.
190. Id. at 92.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Jerusalem, supra note 42, at 253-54.
194. English, supra note 179, at 265.
195. Id. at 266.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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assess whether the offender is engaging in "high-risk or assaultive behav-
ior." 198 The containment approach also utilizes group therapy as a tool for
offenders to help each other recognize and deal with emotional triggers that
can lead to reoffending.
199
IV. REASONING
In Doe v. City of Lafayette, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit sitting en banc conducted a de novo review of the district court's deci-
sion to allow the City of Lafayette to ban a known sex offender from public
parks.20 0 To reach its decision, the court first examined Doe's First
Amendment claim, considering both the freedom of expression and freedom
of thought arguments. 20 1 The court held that Doe's conduct contained no
expressive element that would trigger First Amendment scrutiny.0 2 The
court also rejected Doe's argument that the city was punishing him for his
thoughts, stating that (1) the ban was not a punishment, but a civil, non-
punitive measure,20 3 and (2) Doe did not just have thoughts, but "brought
himself to the brink of committing child molestation.
' 204
The court discussed Doe's Fourteenth Amendment claim by describing
the liberty interest Doe sought to have protected and determining that inter-
est was not a fundamental right.205 In the absence of a fundamental liberty
interest, the court applied a rational basis standard and held the ban was
valid "as the narrowest reasonable means for the City to advance its com-
pelling interest of protecting its children from the demonstrable threat of
sexual abuse by Mr. Doe. 206 After rejecting Doe's arguments, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.20 7
The dissent argued the ban was an impermissible violation of the First
Amendment by punishing Doe for his thoughts.20 8 To support its conclu-
sion, the dissent analyzed three important principles: (1) the First Amend-
ment prohibits government control over a citizen's thoughts, (2) banishment
198. Id.
199. Id. at 273.
200. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 762-63.
201. Id. at 763-67.
202. Id. at 764.
203. Id. at 766, n.8.
204. Id. at 767.
205. Id. at 768-73.
206. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 773-74.
207. Id. at 774. Doe decided not to appeal his case to the United States Supreme Court.
Dan Shaw, John Doe Abandons Legal Fight To End Parks Ban, J. & COURIER (Lafayette,
Ind.), February 24, 2005, at 16A.
208. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 774 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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is a form of punishment, and (3) a citizen may not be punished based on his
status alone.2°9
A. The First Amendment Claim
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that the core of the First
Amendment is the right of self-expression. 2 0 The Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that the First Amendment protects not just speech but also
conduct that has "a significant expressive element." 21' Doe's banishment
from the park only triggers First Amendment scrutiny if he can show "that
his conduct in going to the park in search of children to satisfy deviant de-
sires somehow was infused with an expressive element., 212 The court held
that there was no self-expression in Doe's actions.213 Doe did not go to the
park to protest, read aloud, display artwork, or perform some other expres-
214 Ah asive action. Instead, he was looking for children to satisfy his sexual
urges and put himself in a situation that substantially increased the possibil-
ity of his acting on his sexual impulses.21 5 Because there was no expression
at issue, the court declared that "First Amendment doctrine simply has no
application here. 216
The court began its freedom of thought analysis by conceding that the
government cannot regulate mere thought unaccompanied by conduct.2 17 In
contrast, "regulations aimed at conduct which have only an incidental effect
on thought do not violate the First Amendment's freedom of mind man-
date. 2 18 The court noted the Supreme Court decision in Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton which rejected a freedom of thought challenge to a Georgia law
prohibiting the display of obscene materials. 2 19 The Supreme Court stated
that "the mere fact that... some human 'utterances' or 'thoughts' may be
incidentally affected does not bar the State from acting to protect legitimate
209. Id. at 776-84 (Williams, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 763.
211. Id. (quoting Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986)).
212. Id. at 764.
213. Id. at 763.
214. Doe II, 377 F.3d at 763.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 764.
217. Id. at 765. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67-68 (1973) ("The
fantasies of a drug addict are his own and beyond the reach of government, but government
regulation of drug sales is not prohibited by the Constitution.").
218. DoeflI, 377 F.3d at 765.
219. Paris, 413 U.S. at 67.
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state interests. 22 ° Only those regulations that are aimed at thoughts and
mind control will face First Amendment scrutiny.22'
The court rejected the argument that Doe was being punished for his
thoughts, stating that Doe was not banned from having fantasies about chil-
dren but merely banned from taking steps toward fulfilling those fanta-
sies.222 The city and the parents were not concerned about Doe's thoughts;
they were concerned about him going to the park to act on those thoughts.223
The court concluded that the city was not required to wait until a child was
molested to take action, and the First Amendment did not prohibit the city
from taking the action that it did.224
The court also took exception to Doe's characterization of the ban as a
punishment.225 The court held that the ban was a civil, and therefore non-
punitive, regulation designed to protect the public.226 The court asserted that
the government has broader powers to operate in the civil context as op-
posed to the criminal context, and characterized the ban as a form of "civil
exclusion., 227 The court held that the Supreme Court has consistently up-
held the government's right to restrict dangerous persons, pursuant to cer-
tain procedural safeguards, "who are unable to control their behavior and
who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety. 228 The court
held that the City of Lafayette had the power to address Doe's actions in a
civil law context and did so without violating Doe's rights.229
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Claim
The Court of Appeals first noted the two types of protection under due
process law: procedural and substantive. 230 Because Doe did not raise any
procedural due process arguments, the court expressed no view as to the
procedural due process aspects of the city's ban.23 1 To analyze Doe's sub-
stantive due process argument, the court followed the Supreme Court's
220. Id.
221. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 765.
222. Id. at 766-67.
223. Id. at 767.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 766, n.8.
226. Id.
227. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 766, n.8.
228. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84
(2003) (upholding the constitutionality of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act as a
civil, nonpunitive measure that did not violate the ex post facto clause); Kansas v. Crane, 534
U.S. 407 (2002) (elaborating on Hendricks).
229. Doe llI, 377 F.3d at 766, n.8.
230. Id. at 767-68.
231. Id. at 768.
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mandate that "the inquiry is whether the individual has been subjected to
'the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice.' 23 2 To an-
swer this question, the court first ascertained the nature of the liberty inter-
est Doe was asserting, then determined whether that liberty interest was
fundamental and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.233
The court explained that when providing a description of an asserted
right, a court must be specific and concrete and avoid "sweeping abstrac-
tions and generalities. 234 A certain level of specificity is necessary in order
to "rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due proc-
ess judicial review., 235 Characterizing Doe's liberty interest as a generalized
right to movement was too broad because it implicated both interstate and
intrastate travel.236 The city asserted that the right at issue was the right to
intrastate travel,237 while Doe argued that the liberty at issue was the "basic
right to wander and loiter in public parks. 2 38 Accepting as true Doe's asser-
tion of the right at stake, the court held that it was not fundamental. 239 When
compared with other rights that have been designated as fundamental, in-240 241
cluding the right to marry, the right to have children, the right to mari-
tal privacy,242 the right to use contraception,243 the right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment,244 and the right to bodily integrity,245 Doe's asserted right
to enter public parks to loiter "is not on the same footing., 246 The court rea-
soned that by banning Doe from the parks, the city did not unconstitution-
232. Id. (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819)).
233. Id. at 768-73.
234. Id. at 769.
235. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 769 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722
(1997)).
236. Id. (citing Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2002)).
237. Id. at 769. At least one circuit court has found that the right to intrastate travel is
fundamental; see Johnson, 310 F.3d at 498 ("The right to travel locally through public spaces
and roadways... is an everyday right, a right we depend on to carry out our daily life activi-
ties."). But see Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 902-903 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a
fundamental right to intrastate as opposed to interstate travel).
238. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 769, n. 11.
239. Id. at 769-70. A right that is fundamental is "objectively, deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
240. Doe 11, 377 F.3d at 770 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
241. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
242. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
243. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
244. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
245. Id. (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
246. Doe I1, 377 F.3d at 770.
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ally restrict Doe's movements, but merely restricted his right to enter the
city's parks for recreational purposes, a right that is not fundamental.247
Because the liberty interest Doe asserted was not fundamental, the
court applied a rational basis standard of review to the city's ban.24' This
level of scrutiny required the ban to be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.249 The city asserted, and Doe conceded, that the inter-
est of the city in protecting its children was not only legitimate, but compel-
ling.250 The court easily concluded that Doe's ban from the city parks was
rationally related to that government interest.
2 5 1
C. Dissent
The dissent began its discussion by pointing out the unusual nature of
the case, stating that "it is a rare case where thoughts, as distinct from deeds,
become publicly known., 252 The city acknowledged that Doe's thoughts, as
opposed to an action demonstrating his thoughts, were what prompted the
ban in question.253 To support its conclusion that the ban is an unconstitu-
tional violation of the First Amendment, the dissent discussed three distinct
principles implicated by the ban.254 First, the dissent argued that the First
Amendment prohibits government control over a citizen's thoughts.255 Next,
the dissent explained that the ban imposed on Doe was indeed a punishment
and not a civil, nonpunitive measure as the majority concluded.256 Finally,
the dissent observed that historically, a citizen could not be punished based
solely on his status, and the ban in question does exactly that.257
247. Id. at 771. The court also noted that Doe had not entered the City's parks since
1990, further showing the relative unimportance of his right to enter the parks. Id. The court
does not mention that Doe is a former high school athlete who enjoys basketball, softball,
and other outdoor activities. Gerrety, supra note 13, at 18A. Doe once played softball in the
city park softball league with a group of Lafayette attorneys. Id.
248. Doe llI, 377 F.3d at 773.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. The court also noted that even under a strict scrutiny analysis, which would
require the ban be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest, they would uphold
the ban as constitutional. Id.
252. Id. at 776 (Williams, J., dissenting).
253. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
254. Doe 111, 377 F.3d at 776-84 (Williams, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 776-80 (Williams, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 780-82 (Williams, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 782-84 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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1. The First Amendment Prohibits Government Control Over a Citi-
zen's Thoughts
The dissent began by emphasizing that the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly acknowledged an individual's freedom to control his or her own
thoughts. 258 "[Elven when an individual's ideas concern immoral thoughts
about child pornography, the Court has steadfastly maintained the right to
,,25926think freely. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,26° the federal gov-
ernment sought to criminalize virtual child pornography, in part because the
sexual images might encourage pedophiles to have sexual thoughts about
children. 261 The Court struck down the statute, stating that "the government
'cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling
a person's private thoughts. ,,262 The dissent reasoned that the ban in ques-
tion must be analyzed in accord with the importance historically given to
freedom of thought cases.263
The dissent next examined the city's proffered reason for instituting
the ban, which was to protect its youth from a crime that might happen in
the future.264 According to the dissent, the city and the majority mistakenly
equated a propensity to commit crime with the inability to control the im-
pulse to commit a crime. 265 The dissent asserted that the city crossed the line
between crime prevention and protected speech, noting that "[a]mong free
men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education
and punishment for violations of the law., 2 66 When the government prohib-
258. Doe Ill, 377 F.3d at 776 (Williams, J., dissenting); see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 562 (2003) (striking down a Texas criminal statute that prohibited homosexual, but not
heterosexual sodomy and concluding that "[liberty presumes an autonomy of self that in-
cludes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) (striking down a conviction for possession of obscene
materials in the defendant's home and stating that "[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels
at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."); W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943) (holding that a requirement that schoolchil-
dren participate in the pledge of allegiance impermissibly infringed on "the sphere of intel-
lect and spirit" that the First Amendment protects).
259. Doe Ill, 377 F.3d at 777 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252-53 (2002)).
260. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
261. Ashcroft, 535 at 241. Virtual child pornography is computer-generated images that
portray what appear to be minors engaged in sexual acts. Id.
262. Id. at 253 (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566).
263. Doe 111, 377 F.3d at 777 (Williams, J., dissenting).
264. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
265. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 777-78 (Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566-67); see
also Asheroft, 535 U.S. at 253 ("[Tlhe Court's First Amendment cases draw vital distinctions
between words and deeds, between ideas and conduct."); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 414
(2002) (recognizing that the Constitution does not permit the commitment of a pedophile
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its speech, and analogously thoughts, which "records no crime and creates
no victims by its production," the First Amendment is violated.267
2. The Ban Imposed on Doe Is a Punishment
The dissent next questioned the majority's characterization of the ban
as a civil and, therefore, non-punitive remedy. 268 The dissent listed several
factors a court should review when deciding whether a government action
constitutes punishment:
[W]hether a sanction involves an affirmative restraint, how history has
regarded it, whether it applies to behavior already a crime, the need for a
finding of scienter, its relationship to a traditional aim of punishment,
the presence of a nonpunitive alternative purpose, and whether it is ex-
cessive in relation to that purpose.269
The dissent applied these factors to the ban and found that in the first
place, the ban "unquestionably imposes an affirmative restraint on Doe's
liberty of movement., 270 Additionally, the dissent demonstrated the ban's
furtherance of the traditional aims of punishment.27' In particular, "the ban
serves the twin goals of deterrence, which are to prevent an individual from
repeating conduct as well as preventing similar acts by others. 272 The dis-
sent also noted the similarity between the ban's segregation of Doe from the
rest of the community and a form of supervised release or condition of pro-
bation, which further indicates the punitive nature of the ban.273 The dissent
determined the ban was excessive in relation to its stated purpose because it
had no termination date.274 Finally, the dissent explained that because the
ban is enforced through threat of criminal arrest for trespass, the ban order
without some lack-of-control determination, therefore acknowledging that a pedophile may
control his urges).
267. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 779 (Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at
250).
268. Id. at 780 (Williams, J., dissenting).
269. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 394).
270. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 781 (Williams, J., dissenting). The. traditional aims of punishment are deter-
rence, incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation. Id. (citing Stephen B. Reed, The Demise
of Ozzie and Harriet: Effective Punishment of Domestic Abusers, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 337, 358-63 (1991).
272. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
273. Doe 111, 377 F.3d at 781 (Williams, J., dissenting).
274. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
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is a "judicially enforceable criminal decree" and cannot be considered a
non-punitive civil remedy.275
3. Punishment Based On Status
Finally, the dissent asserted that the city's ban went beyond the scope
of permissible punishment by punishing Doe based on his status as a sex
offender.276 The dissent cited Robinson v. California2 7 to explain the dis-
tinction between punishment levied at a person's conduct and punishment
for a person's status, which is impermissible under the Eighth Amend-
ment.278 In Robinson the Supreme Court struck down a California statute
that made addiction to narcotics illegal because it criminalized the mere
status as a drug addict without requiring any illegal act.279 The Court held
the statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.28 °
The dissent further explained that "Doe's going to the park did not rise
to the level of an 'action' of sufficient gravity to justify punishment. 28'
Going to the park could not be classified as an attempt, nor could it be con-
sidered stalking.282 The dissent made the analogy of a former bank robber
standing in the parking lot of a bank and thinking about robbing it, which
under the law would not be considered an action that merited punishment.283
In the same way that the bank robber could not be charged with attempted
bank robbery for standing outside the bank and thinking about robbing it,
the dissent reasoned that Doe cannot be punished for standing in a public
park and thinking sexual thoughts about children.284
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, the dissent stressed that as a society dealing with the
problem of repeat sex offenders, we should encourage sex offenders to seek
therapy and not punish them when they speak truthfully in an effort to deal
275. Id. at 782 (Williams, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 782-84 (Williams, J., dissenting).
277. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
278. Id. at 666.
279. Id. at 666-67.
280. Id. at 667. See also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (interpreting Robin-
son's explanation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause as meaning "criminal penalties
may be inflicted only if the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior,
which society has an interest in preventing .... ").
281. Doe II1, 377 F.3d at 783 (Williams, J., dissenting).
282. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
283. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
284. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
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with their urges. 285 The dissent predicted a chilling effect that will discour-
age many offenders from seeking treatment out of fear of banishment or
some other civil remedy.286 "In the City's haste to take action to protect its
children, an admirable goal, both the majority and the City fail to apprehend
the possible secondary effects of this ban on the very safety it seeks to en-
sure. 287
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The significance of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Doe v. Lafayette
is that it marks the first time a court has allowed a person to be subjected to
punishment based only on the content of his thoughts without any accompa-
nying actions that interfere with the rights of others.288 The immediate effect
of this ruling is a clear signal sent to sex offenders that they will face further
punishment by seeking treatment and being honest about their problems
with inappropriate thoughts and urges. 289 The decision may also encourage
city and state legislators to enact similar regulations in their own jurisdic-
tions now that they know the ban has been upheld.29 °
A. A Dangerous Precedent
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Doe III establishes a dangerous
precedent by allowing a person to be exposed to criminal sanctions based on
only the content of his thoughts. There are many people who enter parks on
a daily basis who could be thinking offensive thoughts, and at the time the
ban was imposed, there were about 100 convicted sex offenders living in the
greater Lafayette area, but only Doe has been banned. 291 The majority char-
acterized the ban as a civil measure to avoid the label of punishment,292 but,
similar to a civil order of protection, the violation of the ban triggers a
criminal arrest and allows the city to proscribe conduct that is, under normal
circumstances, completely lawful.293 Exposure to criminal sanctions without
285. Id. at 784 (Williams, J., dissenting).
286. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
287. Doe 111, 377 F.3d at 784 (Williams, J., dissenting).
288. See infra Part V.A. See also Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Freedom of
Thought-Seventh Circuit Upholds City's Order Banning Former Sex Offender from Public
Parks, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1054, 1060-61 (2005).
289. See infra Part V.B.
290. See infra Part V.C.
291. Ron Browning, Pedophiles Prohibition Repealed: 7th Circuit Says Lafayette Cannot
Ban Sex Offender From Parks, IND. LAW., July 16, 2003, at 1.
292. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 766, n.8.
293. See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
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committing any type of violation undermines society's trust in the criminal
justice system as a whole; "[i]t is ... important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his gov-
ernment cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing
a proper factfinder of his guilt . ,294 If Doe can be punished after sharing
his thoughts with others, simply because the city does not approve of those
thoughts, there could be a chilling effect on not just sex offenders' freedom
of thought and expression, but the freedom of thought and expression of
anyone who wishes to voice an unpopular idea or opinion.
B. Discouraging Rehabilitation
The most significant and immediate impact of the Doe III decision is
its discouraging effect on sex offenders seeking treatment. Mr. Doe was
arguably doing all he could to not reoffend by actively participating in psy-
chological treatment and voluntarily attending group therapy to help him
control his fantasies about children. 295 When Doe did have inappropriate
thoughts, he took steps to deal with them by contacting his therapist and
discussing the incident with his support group. 296 In return for his honesty,
Doe was punished by the city, sending a message to other offenders that
they would be better off not sharing their thoughts with others. 297 The dis-
sent correctly stated that "[o]nce released back into our society, a former sex
offender must feel free to seek therapy and must be supported in his efforts
to control his urges rather than penalized., 298 The majority's decision, how-
ever, will discourage, not encourage, offenders to discuss their thoughts and
problems with others.
C. Encouraging Similar Regulations
The Seventh Circuit's endorsement of the ban will undoubtedly impact
the efforts of other cities to control the risk that sex offenders pose to their
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1406 (1991) (providing an in-depth look at the use of
civil remedies to address criminal behavior).
294. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
295. Doe 111, 377 F.3d at 774 (Williams, J., dissenting). Mr. Doe had also practiced aver-
sion therapy by sniffing ammonia capsules when he had improper sexual urges. Gerrety,
supra note 15, at 8A.
296. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 775 (Williams, J., dissenting).
297. Kelly Spencer, Note, Sex Offenders and the City: Ban Orders, Freedom of Move-
ment, and Doe v. City of Lafayette, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 297, 328 (2002).
298. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 784. In an interview, one convicted child molester who is also
active in rehabilitation efforts stated that without the benefit of counseling, offenders are just
as likely to reoffend when released from jail as when they went in. Popkin, supra note 145, at
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children. Cities will be more willing to impose similar restrictions now that
precedent has been established that the ban is constitutional. While Doe III
was in litigation, another Indiana city, Michigan City, imposed a lifetime
ban on all child molesters from entering their city parks. 299 The Indiana
Civil Liberties Union challenged the ban, and the city amended the ban to
apply to only one sex offender, Robert E. Brown.300 Brown has filed suit
against the city challenging the ban,30 1 but now that one ban has been up-
held, Brown's chances of defeating the ban have considerably lessened.
The court's approval of the ban may also encourage legislators to pass
laws authorizing the use of banishment as a valid restriction on sex offend-
ers. The city park ban became a campaign issue in 2004, with one candidate
for the Indiana House of Representatives, Connie Basham, promising to
propose a law that bans all child molesters from parks.30 2 Basham, the for-
mer Tippecanoe County Commissioner, lost her bid for the House of Repre-
sentatives but still says she would support similar bans in all places where
children are without the protection of adults such as bus stops or school
property.30 3 As publicity concerning sex offenders and their repeat offenses
continues to outrage the public, legislators may soon feel it necessary to
give local governments statutory authority to ban certain citizens from pub-
lic areas.
VI. CONCLUSION
Crime is a serious social problem in the United States, with sex crimes
considered among the most heinous and deserving of severe penalties. 3°
The highly emotional response to sex offenses, coupled with a general fear
of crime, media sensationalism, and dissatisfaction with the criminal justice
system, have influenced legislators and government officials to impose
ever-increasing restrictions on sex offenders released back into society. 30 5
At the same time, however, the constitutional rights of the individual, in-
cluding the right to think and express ideas freely, must not be violated,
299. Browning, supra note 291, at 1.
300. Id.
301. Brown filed suit against Michigan City, challenging the ban as a civil rights viola-
tion. Brown v. Michigan City, No. 3:02cv572 (N.D. Ind. filed August 13, 2002). Cross mo-
tions for summary judgment have been filed and the case is awaiting decision. See current
legal docket of the Indiana Civil Liberties Union at http://www.iclu.org/legal
/current.asp#miscellaneous (last visisted Oct. 3, 2005).
302. Molesters, a Ban, and Our Parks: A False Security, J. & COURIER (Lafayette, Ind.),
July 27, 2004, at 5A.
303. Shaw, supra note 207, at 16A. No bills of that kind have been introduced in the
Indiana legislature so far this session. Id.
304. Lieb, supra note 5, at 44-46.
305. Id.
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otherwise "the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment are virtually
meaningless. 30 6 John Doe stood at the center of this conflict, representing
the struggle between the efforts to protect citizens from sex offenders and
the civil rights of an individual who has paid his debt to society.307 The de-
cision in Doe v. Lafayette demonstrates that, at least for now, the civil liber-
ties of the individual will be sacrificed for the perceived greater good.
Elizabeth Cloud*
306. Doe III, 377 F.3d at 785 (Williams, J., dissenting).
307. Gerrety, supra note 13, at 18A.
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